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Introduction1
We recently passed the fortieth anniversary of Rabbi
Soloveitchik’s magisterial essay on interreligious dialogue,
Confrontation.2 Rabbi Soloveitchik (1903-1993) was the
leading modern Orthodox religious authority in America
during his lifetime and his religious opinions and rulings are
still considered authoritative by American orthodoxy. That he
is called the Rav (the Rabbi) by many reflects this high
standing. His 1964 essay on interreligious dialogue has
defined the orthodox community’s approach to dialogue with
other religions, in particular Roman Catholicism. Indeed,
many in the orthodox community have viewed the essay as
a legal decision or psak halacha3 and some have referred to
it as the “Soloveitchik Line.”4 Three years ago Rabbi Eugene
Korn provided a probing reassessment of that essay in a
symposium on the question of interfaith dialogue sponsored

1

I want to thank Claire Morisset for research assistance, and Rabbi Jack
Bemporad and A.G. Harmon for their careful reading of an earlier
version of the text.

2

Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” Tradition 6/2 (1964): 5ff.,
available
at
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/
cjrelations/resources/articles/soloveitchik/.

3

As are clearly the piskei halacha of Rav Moshe Feinstein. See David
Ellenson, “A Jewish Legal Authority Addresses Jewish-Christian
Dialogue,” American Jewish Archives 52/1-2 (2000):112ff. One should
note on this point David Hartman’s description of the Rav’s essay “as a
rare theological responsum carrying the weight of a halakhic decision.
None of R. Soloveitchik’s other theological writings were understood to
have the authority of Halakhah” [David Hartman, Love and Terror in the
God Encounter: The Theological Legacy of Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2004), 132].

4

Norman Solomon, “The ‘Soloveitchik Line’ on Dialogue” in Dan CohnSherbok ed., Problems in Contemporary Jewish Theology (Lewiston,
NY: E. Mellen Press, 1991), 225.
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by Boston College.5 That reassessment in turn brought forth
further comments.6 Below are some of my own reactions to
this ongoing debate.
Soloveitchik’s essay presents a complex argument
based on a moral anthropology embedded in an
interpretation of the biblical account of the creation of man.7
The article develops three paradigms of human nature. The
first paradigm is that of man as a natural creature.8 In that
state, “[h]e fails to realize his great capacity for winning
freedom from an unalterable natural order and offering this
very freedom as the great sacrifice to God, who wills man to
be free in order that he may commit himself unreservedly
and forfeit his freedom.”9
The second paradigm presents man in the
confrontational or normative state.10 He separates himself
from nature and “discovers an awesome and mysterious
domain of things and events which is independent of and
disobedient to him.… In the wake of this discovery, he
discovers himself.” As a result of that self-discovery and its
opposition with “a non-I outside,” the divine norm is born:
“‘And the Lord God commanded the man.’”11
5

Eugene Korn, “The Man of Faith and Religious Dialogue: Revisiting
‘Confrontation’ After Forty Years.” http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/metaelements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/Korn_23Nov03.htm.
Rabbi Korn has since published an updated version, “The Man of Faith
and Religious Dialogue: Revisiting ‘Confrontation’,” Modern Judaism
25/2 (2005):290-315.

6

http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/
soloveitchik/#2

7

“Confrontation,” 5-17.

8

Ibid., 5-9.

9

Ibid., 7.

10

Ibid., 9-13.

11

Ibid., 9.
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Finally, the third paradigm is that of reciprocal
confrontation, based on readings of the relationship between
Adam and Eve and Jacob and Esau,12
At this level, man finds himself confronted
again. Only this time it is not the confrontation of
a subject who gazes, with a sense of superiority,
at the object beneath him, but of two equal
subjects, both lonely in their otherness and
uniqueness, both opposed and rejected by an
objective order, both craving for companionship.
This confrontation is reciprocal, not unilateral.
This time the two confronters stand alongside
each other, each admitting the existence of the
other. An aloof existence is transformed into a
together-existence.”13
From this theological understanding of the development
of human nature Soloveitchik concludes that the faith
experience is private and incommunicable. Building on that
argument he determines that proposals for interreligious
dialogue are analytically flawed and should be proscribed.
Eugene Korn, in turn, suggests that sociological and
philosophical changes in Western society since the writing of
“Confrontation” warrant a reassessment of the proscription
against interreligious dialogue, especially in light of the
Catholic Church’s abandonment of its doctrine of
supersession.
This paper will examine first the structural logic of
Soloveitchik’s argument. It will then explore the intellectual
and sociological background and assumptions which
undergird his approach. Finally, I briefly discuss what I see
as the virtues of interreligious dialogue.
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1. Soloveitchik’s Argument
A. The Suggestion that Interreligious Dialogue is Flawed
because Belief is Incommensurable.
According to one view, in “Confrontation” Soloveitchik is
making an epistemological argument that faith claims are
ultimately incommensurable and must be taken for what they
are, faith claims.14 Thus he states: “The great encounter
between God and man is a wholly personal private affair
incomprehensible to the outsider”15 and “The divine
message is incommunicable since it defies all standardized
media of information and all objective categories.”16
Perhaps this approach reflects Soloveitchik’s analogy to the
encounter between Adam and Eve where Soloveitchik
explains that “the closer two individuals get to know each
other, the more aware they become of the metaphysical
distance separating them.”17 He further tells us that this is
true “even to a brother of the same faith community.”18
We must be clear that when Soloveitchik refers to
incommensurability he is actually talking about a limited
class of religious language. He appears to be arguing that
the language of religious claims is a language whose words
“refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to
his immediate private sensations.”19 The only way this could
14

Ibid., 18-19.

15

Ibid., 24.

16

Ibid., 15.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.

19
12

Ibid., 14.

13

Ibid.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York:
Macmillan, 1953), Sec. 243 at 89e, says it is akin to a private “diary
e
about the recurrence of a certain sensation.” See also, Sec. 258 at 92
and the reference to “private sensations.”

http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art18

Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations

make sense is if Soloveitchik were referring to the religious
sensory experience itself, and not to Jewish theology or
even the “life form” of Judaism, to use a Wittgensteinian
term.
The issue of the possibility of a “private language” is
extremely controversial and has engendered considerable
philosophical literature.20 Ludwig Wittgenstein argued
against the possibility of a private language in his 1953 book
Philosophical Investigations.21 As Stewart Candlish has
written, “[t]he essence of the argument is simple. It is that a
language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its user
would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because
no meanings could be established for its signs. … The
conclusion is that it is impossible for a private linguist to
establish and maintain a rule for the use of an expression, so
that meaning is unobtainable in a private language.”22 At
best, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that the private
language concept might be available for the recordation of
speech that refers to an individual’s own sensations.23
The opportunity of applying any kind of ‘private language’
to religious claims, however, has been critiqued by Kai
Nielsen who argues that even if religious language reflects a
distinct “form of life”24 (which suggests that no one but a
20

21

See, e.g., John V. Canfield, ed., The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Vol. 9:
The Private Language Argument (New York: Garland, 1986), especially
the essays by Ayer (p. 1), Kenny (pp. 130 and 208), and Anscombe (p.
316).
See note 19.

22

Stewart Candlish, “Private Language Argument,” in Edward Craig ed.,
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998),
vol. 7: 693-698.

23

Wittgenstein, Sec. 243 at 88e-89e.

24

Kai Nielsen, “Wittgensteinian Fideism,” Philosophy 42 (1967): 193: “The
different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life have a
logic of their own.”
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believer can criticize a particular religion), this does not
preclude our asking about the coherence of the concepts
involved and about the reality of what its members have
conceptualized. As Nielsen points out, “The need to start
from ‘inside’ need not preclude the recognition of clefts,
inconsistencies, and elements of incoherence in the very
practice (form of life).”25
Some, like David Berger, have tried to salvage
Soloveitchik’s notion of incommensurability by suggesting
that while the “intellectual apprehension” of faith, in contrast
to the “personal experience” of faith, can be communicated,
such communication “is pitifully inadequate.”26 In contrast,
others like Rabbi Irving Greenberg argue that
[I]n matters doctrinal and theological, all
religions spoke their own private language. It
would be a violation of the spiritual-theological
intimacy between the religious community
and God to share the content of the internal
conversation with members of another faith.
Translating the categories of faith into
terminology comprehensible to believers of
another tradition would be a betrayal.27
Thus, Jews can ‘talk’ the language of Jewish theology to
Jews, but not to Christians.
25

Nielsen, 205-206.

26

Rabbi David Berger, “Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After Forty Years: A
Response to Rabbi Eugene Korn,” available at: http://www.bc.edu/
research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/
Berger_23Nov03.htm.

27

Irving Greenberg, For the Sake of Heaven and Earth: The New
Encounter between Judaism and Christianity (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society, 2004), 13. I fail to understand the concept of
betrayal here. Indeed, it would seem that much of Greenberg’s
theological work performs this “translation” function.
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I fail to understand, however, why a faith experience
cannot be dissected and discussed. Even if I experience
God in a chariot trailing clouds of glory, why am I incapable
of describing that experience, however inartfully?
Nonetheless, Berger’s point, even if true, is essentially
irrelevant to our discussion of the possibility of dialogue.
What we normally understand as theological dialogue is not
the comparison of mutual personal faith experiences but
rather the discussion of principles of faith. The delegitimation
of substantive theological dialogue, as will be noted later,
must be based on different grounds.
If perceptions of faith cannot be communicated between
different communities of faith, are we to argue that a
member of one faith community cannot lecture or write about
his faith to a member of another faith community?
Remember, Soloveitchik himself gave his famous lecture
“The Lonely Man of Faith”28 to a Catholic audience.
Obviously he was concerned with communicating with his
audience.
To carry the point further, if issues of faith are
incommensurable, what do we say about the work of
scholars like Harry Wolfson who wrote on the Church
Fathers,29 Travers Herford who wrote on the Pharisees as
well as the Talmud,30 or George Foot Moore who studied
Judaism in the age of the mishnah?31

Volume 1, (2005-2006): 151-169

As to Greenberg’s suggestion of betrayal, restated by
Shalom Carmy as the view that no “refined person would
‘dialogue’ explicitly with friends and acquaintances about his
most intimate family relations,”32 I see this as an argument
about propriety, not impossibility. I would suggest that the
propriety would depend on the facts and circumstances of
the individual case.
B. The Relationship Between the “Community of the
Many” and the “Community of the Few.”
In large measure, I suspect Soloveitchik’s concern was
that any dialogue between the majority religion (Christianity)
and the minority religion (Judaism) would not be a dialogue
between equal subjects, but between a majority lording it
over a minority. He appears to believe that in any dialogue
with Christians, Jews as a minority religion will not receive
what they expect from others, “recognition not as objects,
but precisely as subjects of faith.”33 He seems to suggest
that such encounters can only come out badly for Jews.
Thus, we can best comprehend Soloveitchik’s
understanding of interfaith dialogue as a claim regarding
disputations – that is to say a dispute between two sides with
a winner and a loser. The long and lachrymose history of
such dialogue between Jews and Christians34 would
32

Shalom Carmy, “’Orthodoxy is Reticence’ – Taking Theology Seriously,”
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/
soloveitchik/sol_carmy.htm.

33

Leon Klenicki, “The Jewish Religious Traditions” in George F. McLean &
st
John P. Hogan eds., Ecumenism and Nostra Aetate in the 21 Century
35, 37 (Washington, D.C.: John Paul II Cultural Center, Council for
Research in Values and Philosophy, 2005): 37.

34

See for example Hyam Maccoby, Judaism On Trial: Jewish Christian
Disputations in the Middle Ages (Rutherford, NJ.: Fairleigh Dickinson
University Press, 1982) which describes disputations in Paris in 1240,
Barcelona in 1263, and Tortosa in 1413-14, on pp. 19, 39 and 82
respectively. The Barcelona disputation included Nachmanides. See

28

Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Lonely Man of Faith (New Jersey:
Jason Aronson Inc., 1965)
29
Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
30
R. Travers Herford, The Pharisees (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) and
Talmud and Apocrypha and a Comparative Study of the Jewish Ethical
Teaching in the Rabbinical and Non-Rabbinical Sources in the Early
Centuries (London: Soncino Press, 1933).
31
George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era,
the Age of the Tannaim (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

Breger, “A Reassesssment of Rav Soloveitchik’s Essay on Interfaith Dialogue” 155

http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art18

Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations

certainly support this view. As Irving Greenberg suggests, in
Soloveitchik’s understanding, the result would be “a
distortion in which the views of the minority – that is, Jews –
would be placed on a Procrustean bed and would be
stretched and cut to the measure of the majority faith.”35
I do not understand contemporary efforts at interreligious
dialogue in that sense. Interreligious dialogue is not a debate
to determine whose view of God is correct or “better.”
Rather, it is an effort at understanding – understanding the
“other” religion and its theological basis. Such interconvictional dialogue, I would argue, can lead to “fruitful
engagement in the meeting of diverse religious
communities.”36 But it is clear that “a prime element in fruitful
encounter must be the location of actual belief differences.”37
For Jews this is especially important because it means
providing an accurate description of the concepts of Judaism
and where they differ from Christianity. This, I might add, will
often require assisting Christians to understand that many of
their historically enshrined stereotypes of Jewish law and
theology do not reflect what Jews actually believe. Such
dialogue is far from an attempt to reconcile differences.
The essential point of Korn’s position regarding interfaith
dialogue is the distinction between dialogue and disputation.
He likes the former and will have nothing to do with the
latter. That distinction, it seems to me, is really one of motive
and nothing more. Certainly one can understand why Korn
would argue that Jews should not enter into discussions
about religion with persons seeking to convert them. At a
minimum (in Soloveitchik’s terms) such conduct shows a
complete lack of “mutual respect.” Nonetheless it is unclear
Robert Chazan, Barcelona and Beyond: The Disputation of 1263 and Its
Aftermath (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
35
Greenberg, 13.
36
James Van McClendon and James M. Smith, Understanding Religious
Convictions (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 175.
37
Ibid.
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to me why the motive for making a statement has anything to
do with the truth of that statement. If this point is correct then
Korn’s (and Soloveitchik’s?) opposition to dialogue is a
matter of taste, not a matter of analytic truth.
Now I have to be fair. I don’t know if Christians want to
enter the dialogue simply in an attempt to understand the
other religion and its theological base. Perhaps they want to
convince me or to convince themselves of the superiority of
their faith system. So be it. Or to put it another way, why do I
care? If I can learn something about the nature of the world
or the nature of the human spiritual longing while they are
trying to score points, it’s their problem.
Now I would not have said that during the Middle Ages
when Judaism was in an empirically inferior position to
Christianity. Perhaps then I would have worried that my
coreligionists (or even I, myself) would have lost heart in the
interreligious dialogue and passed over to the other “team.”
But that was then and this is now.
C. An Assessment of the Inequality of the Relationship
between Various Religions
My reading of “Confrontation” suggests that in
Soloveitchik’s view, the deep theological structure of
Christianity is antagonistic to Judaism and Christianity would
not be Christianity if it did not treat Jews as unequal.
Although he does not use these terms, one can argue that
Soloveitchik’s approach to the status of the Catholic-Jewish
relationship is essentialist and determinist. It is as if
Soloveitchik understood the relationship between Judaism
and Christianity in ontological terms, as a relationship in
which the inequality is immutable, as though the negativity
were rooted in necessary Christian doctrine. By this I mean
that they reflect in some sense a moral anthropology – one

http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art18
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fixed and incapable of essential or transformative change.38
And that being the case, Soloveitchik’s stricture against
interfaith dialogue is absolute and not contingent on either
history or sociology.
One can well understand why Soloveitchik, steeped as
he was in Jewish history and religious thought, would hold
this view. Further, as Korn notes, Soloveitchik wrote in 1964,
one year before Vatican II and the stream of theological reevaluations undertaken by the Catholic Church.
Prior to this development, the Church was wedded to the
teaching of contempt,39 buttressed by a doctrine of
supersession which stated that whatever value Judaism had
ended with the coming of Christianity. That position is no
more. Consider but one text, the 2002 Pontifical Biblical
Commission document, The Jewish People and their Sacred
Scriptures in the Christian Bible.40 It is official Church
teaching with a preface by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, at the
time head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
and now Pope Benedict XVI. That document states, “Without
the Old Testament the New Testament would be an

Volume 1, (2005-2006): 151-169

incomprehensible book, a plant deprived of its roots and
destined to dry up and wither.”41 And consider this
statement: “Jewish messianic expectation is not in vain. It
can become for us Christians a powerful stimulant to keep
alive the eschatological dimension of our faith. Like them,
we too live in expectation.”42 Following Romans 11:1,43 the
document elaborates and reaffirms that the Jewish people
have an eternal, unbreakable covenant with God, as indeed
do numerous Church documents published after Vatican II.
Faced with this evidence of recent history, one can take
either of two approaches.
One can remain skeptical of Catholic intentions and
argue that one should not really believe that this doctrinal
transformation is sincere or will last. For such persons their
required threshold of proof means that as a practical matter
they will never accept the Church’s bona fides in this area.
There are adumbrations of this approach in the comments to
Korn’s paper by Erica Brown44 and Aryeh Klapper.45 I believe
that (writing before Vatican II) Soloveitchik’s opposition to
41

38

See Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, “Tav Lemeitav Tan Du Mi-Lemeitav Armalu:
An Analysis of the Presumption,” Edah 4/1 (2004), available at
http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/4_1_kaddari.pdf. It is interesting that Halperin-Kaddari associates such a view with the Rav in her
analysis of the talmudic presumption of Tav Lemeitav Tan Du MiLemeitav Armalu that a woman would rather be married to a bad
husband than remain single, Baba Qamma 110b-111a. She reviews the
various understandings of that concept. She notes that the Rav took a
relatively “strict” view of Tav Lemeitav, appearing to base his analysis
on an ontological understanding of the “essence” of the gender
distinction which has, in his own words, “nothing to do with the social
and political status of women in antiquity.” The presumption, he
suggests, is not based on psychology, but “is an existential fact.” It may
be that Soloveitchik approaches the relationship of the “community of
the many” and the “community of the few” in a similarly determinist way.
39
Jules Isaac, The Teaching of Contempt: Christian Roots of AntiSemitism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
40
Available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/
pcb_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020212_popolo-ebraico_en.html.
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42

Ibid, Preface.
Ibid., §21.

43

“What I am saying is this: is it possible that God abandoned his people?
Out of the question! I too am an Israelite, descended from Abraham, of
the tribe of Benjamin.” (New Jerusalem Bible)
44
“Political correctness cannot be bought at the price of historical dignity.
Rethinking the proselytization of Jews is still not enough to bring us to
authentic dialogue about our belief systems.” Erica Brown, “The UnResponse,” http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/
conferences/soloveitchik/sol_brown.htm.
45
“What one pope has done, another can put asunder – I will never forget
Hirsch Goodman, in the August 2001 issue of Jerusalem Report,
explaining that the peace of Oslo had become entrenched in Palestinian
hearts to the extent that it was irreversible. The Vatican’s grudging and
belated diplomatic acceptance of the Israeli state is to my mind far from
an acknowledgment of the Jewish right to our homeland.” Aryeh
Klapper, “Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After Forty Years – A Response to
Rabbi Eugene Korn,” http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/
texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/Klapper_23Nov03.htm.
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interfaith dialogue drew on a suspicion “that a strong
conversionist impulse lurked behind Christian dialogue
efforts” and a fear “that a tidal wave of interfaith interest
might sweep many Jews into the bosom of the church.”46
The second approach, shared, I believe by both Eugene
Korn47 and David Berger48 (but not made explicitly) is that
46
47

Greenberg, 13.
Eugene Korn (see note 5) points out:
The critical distinction between the respectful hearing of the religious
voices of others and doctrinal disputation untangles the paradox of R.
Soloveitchik's private conversation with Christian religious thinkers, whose
insights he integrated into his religious Weltanschauung, and his rejection
of formal interfaith dialogue on theological subjects. The former posed no
threat to the validity of his faith, while he assumed that the latter was
targeted at undermining Jewish faith commitment. To employ the favorite
technique of R. Soloveitchik's Brisker tradition, there are two concepts of
theological discourse: one is authentic dialogue, which is free religious
expression that is governed by the legitimacy of difference and mutual
respect; the other is polemical disputation, which is futile in its illogic and
objectionable in its triumphalism.

48

David Berger (see note 26) argues:
[A]s much as theological propositions can be conveyed, as much as even
religious emotions can be partially expressed, that which ultimately
commits a person to God or a faith community to its particular relationship
with God remains essentially private, leaving not only a lonely man of faith
but a lonely people of faith – a nation that dwells alone.
Since Rabbi Soloveitchik believed that untrammeled interfaith dialogue
presumes to enter into that realm, he declares it out of bounds. Even
though dialogue among believers concentrating on social issues has a
religious dimension, it does not presume to enter that innermost realm,
and its value therefore outweighs its dangers. If I am correct, then even
theological discussion that knows its place would not be subject to the
most radical critique in “Confrontation,” and in this general sense I am in
agreement with Dr. Korn.

Berger continues:
But it is critically important to recognize that the incommunicability of the
ultimate religious commitment is not the totality of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s
argument. The very fact that he goes beyond that point lends credence to
the view that he did not mean it as an all-encompassing delegitimation of
any theological discussion. If he did, there would have been little reason
to go further. But he does go further, and here his argument moves from
the extreme rhetoric of philosophical absolutism to the penetrating,
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Soloveitchik’s injunction against dialogue should be
understood as a prudential point about the wisdom of
dialogue rather than a normative argument asserting the
impossibility of dialogue.
On this view one would recognize that the intellectual
and sociological context has changed in fundamental ways
in the forty years since “Confrontation” was written, and that
these changes cannot help but have an effect on the force of
Soloveitchik’s conclusions. While I am certainly sympathetic
to this approach as a way of salvaging Soloveitchik’s views
in the light of historical change, nowhere does Soloveitchik
say some dialogue is acceptable by certain people under
certain circumstances. While he does set down four
conditions for interfaith dialogue,49 a fair reading of the essay
suggests that in Soloveitchik’s view these conditions cannot
ever be met.
pragmatic, prescient insights that make “Confrontation” an essay of
ongoing relevance.
49

I quote from “Confrontation”:
First, we must state, in unequivocal terms, the following. We are a totally
independent faith community. We do not revolve as a satellite in any
orbit. Nor are we related to any other faith community as “brethren” even
though “separated.” . . . . [p. 21].
Second, the logos, the word, in which the multifarious religious
experience is expressed does not lend itself to standardization or
universalization.… [I]t is important that the religious or theological logos
should not be employed as the medium of communication between two
faith communities whose modes of expression are as unique as their
apocalyptic experiences . . . . [pp. 23-24].
Third, we members of the community of the few should always act with
tact and understanding and refrain from suggesting to the community of
the many, which is both proud and prudent, changes in ritual or
emendations of its texts…. Interference with and non-involvement in
something which is totally alien to us is a conditio sine qua non for the
furtherance of good will and mutual respect [pp. 24-25].
Fourth, we certainly have not been authorized by our history, sanctified by
the martyrdom of millions, to even hint to another faith community that we
are mentally ready to revise historical attitudes, to trade favors pertaining
to fundamental matters of faith, and to reconcile “some” differences [p 25].

See also Korn’s discussion [see note 5] of these conditions.
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D. The Danger of Syncretism
One of the fears Soloveitchik expressed was the danger
of syncretism, that is, the attempted reconciliation or union of
different or opposing religious principles, or practices, by
incorporating elements of one religion into another. This
concern has some basis in reality. Many of the less
sophisticated proponents of interreligious dialogue point to
the overlapping roots of Judaism and Christianity and move
rapidly to the idea that common origins means a common
belief. Many politicians refer blithely to the Judeo-Christian
tradition to promote religious tolerance and the full
integration of Jews into American society. This ecumenism
can easily lead to a subjectivism by which all religions (or at
least all Abrahamic religions) are seen as essentially equal –
each being as good as the next. On this view, “all religions
are diverse symbolic objectifications of the same basic
spiritual experience and intimation of Ultimate Being.”50
Alternatively the search for a common core can result in
a dilution of one’s own distinct religious doctrine. I once
learned political theory with the magisterial John Plamenetz,
who notwithstanding his erudition managed somehow to
make thinkers as disparate as Hegel, Rousseau and Kant
come out as slightly eccentric English liberals. Something
similar could result from untrammeled interreligious dialogue.
And indeed if you read a book like Faith Transformed:
Christian Encounters with Jews and Judaism51 it is obvious
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that engaging Jewish theology has affected the theological
thinking of many Christian scholars. But it need not be the
case. It depends on the person and the character of the
“dialogue.”
Orthodox Judaism recoils at either of these possibilities
of syncretism and insists on the uniqueness of the Jewish
religious “project” asserting that existentially the Jews are a
“people who dwell alone.” This negative reaction to anything
that smacks of common beliefs may be a key to
understanding the Orthodox “mood” on dialogue.52
E. How Do You Divide the Sacred from the Profane in
Civic Life?
As is well known, while Soloveitchik proscribed what he
calls theological dialogue, he did allow, and indeed
encouraged, coalitions of interfaith groups to discuss and act
on social welfare issues. Thus Soloveitchik has noted:
As a matter of fact our common interests lie not in the
realm of faith, but in that of the secular orders.
There, we all face a powerful antagonist, we all have
to contend with a considerable number of matters of
great concern. The relationship between two
communities must be outer-directed and related to
the secular orders with which men of faith come face
to face. In the secular sphere, we may discuss
positions to be taken, ideas to be evolved, and plans
to be formulated. In these matters, religious
communities may together recommend action to be

50

Tamar Ross, “Reflections on the Possibilities of Interfaith
Communication in Our Day,” Edah 1/1 (2000):5 at http://www.edah.org/
backend/JournalArticle/ross.pdf. She goes on to say, “[M]y exposure to
any rival religion can teach me something about our common core, thus
increasing the potential for correction and refinement of my own
particular truth. In that event, interfaith encounters become mutually
enriching and the existence of diverse religious expressions mandates
cooperation and mutual respect” (p. 5).
51
John C. Merkle, ed., Faith Transformed: Christian Encounters with Jews
and Judaism (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003).
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I recently saw a production of Hyam Maccoby’s “The Disputation.” While
not vouching for its historical accuracy, no one watching Theodore
Bikel’s presentation of Nachmanides would worry about disputations
ineluctably leading to syncretism. See:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR
2005092900586_3.html.
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developed and may seize the initiative to be
implemented later by general society. 53
Indeed, that has been the stated position of the modern
orthodox community.54
Given Soloveitchik’s general proscription I find this
“waiver” puzzling. Certainly, as a theoretical matter one
cannot separate secular activity for the common good from
its theological underpinnings. This is true of Judaism and
from what I can see from teaching at the Catholic University
of America for Roman Catholicism as well. The extraordinary
emphasis on “hesed” at my law school (where law review
editors sign up for their stint at homeless food preparation)
stems from their understanding of Catholic mission.
Ironically, Soloveitchik recognized this. In a footnote in
“Confrontation,” he wrote, “The term ‘secular orders’ is used
here in accordance with its popular semantics. For the man
of faith, this term is a misnomer. God claims the whole, not
a part of man, and whatever He established as an order
within the scheme of creation is sacred.”55 This makes it
difficult to work out the boundaries of common welfare
activities from religious interaction.
53
54

Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” p. 24.
See Rabbinical Council of America, “Statement Adopted by the
Rabbinical Council of America at the Mid-Winter Conference, February
3-5, 1964,” Tradition 6/2 (1964): 28-29:
Any suggestion that the historical and meta-historical worth of a faith
community be viewed against the backdrop of another faith, and the mere
hint that a revision of basic historic attitudes is anticipated, are
incongruous with the fundamentals of religious liberty and freedom of
conscience and can only breed discord and suspicion. Such an approach
is unacceptable to any self-respecting faith community that is proud of its
past, vibrant and active in the present and determined to live on in the
future and to continue serving God in its own individual way. Only full
appreciation on the part of all of the singular role, inherent worth and
basic prerogatives of each religious community will help promote the spirit
of cooperation among faiths.

55

Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” note 8.

Volume 1, (2005-2006): 151-169

As but one example, consider the State of Israel, a topic
for which the Jewish community may well most desire wider
public political support. Putting secular Zionism aside, it is
passing certain that Zionism from an Orthodox perspective is
based on theological tenets – as but one example, some
affirm that the establishment of the State of Israel is the
beginning of the “dawn of our redemption.”56 Indeed,
Soloveitchik himself has argued for the religious, that is to
say halakhic (if not messianic) status of the Jewish state in
Kol Dodi Dofek.57 Conversely, while sympathy for Israel after
World War II was clearly based on Christian sympathy (if not
guilt) after the Holocaust, doctrinal acceptance by Christians,
whether Catholic or Evangelical, turns on their understandings (albeit differing) of Christian theology. How can one
create a religious coalition on behalf of Israel while ignoring
religious doctrine? The same is true, if not less obvious, with
religious coalitions for social justice, protection of the
environment or other aspects of tikkun olam.
F. Soloveitchik and the “Soloveitchik Line”
In trying to understand the varieties of meanings drawn
from the text in “Confrontation” regarding interreligious
dialogue, one is reminded of Karl Marx’s adage, “All I know
is that I am not a Marxist.”58 The fact is that while numerous
scholars claim to follow Soloveitchik’s teaching, they
56

The Hebrew is Reishit Tzmichat Ge’ulatinu, which translates more
accurately as the beginning of the flowering of our redemption. The term
comes from a prayer for the state of Israel drafted by Chief Rabbi
Yitzhak Herzog in 1948. The phrase is considered central to our
understanding of religious Zionism, which views the creation of the state
of Israel in eschatological terms.
57
Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Kol Dodi Dofek: Listen - My Beloved Knocks
(Jersey City, NJ: KTAV, 2006)
58
“Letter from Friedrich Engels to Conrad Schmidt” (Aug. 5, 1890), in
Dona Torr, ed., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Correspondence 18461895 (London: M. Lawrence, 1934), 472.
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interpret the meaning of his proscription against
interreligious dialogue in radically different and at times
contradictory ways.59
Marc B. Shapiro, citing David Hartman, suggests that the
proscription is against “some sort of organized, presumably
official, meeting,” between members of each religion.60 The
concept calls to mind the medieval disputation and the sad
history of Jewish-Catholic relations to which they testify.61
But those disputations were not necessarily “official” in
the sense that the debaters were authorized to represent
their faiths. Indeed, while the Church has official theologians,
it is not clear that Judaism has any such “office” within its
hierarchy.
In marked contrast David Berger suggests that “[i]t is…
friendly
theological
discussion
and
not
religious
disputation”62 that is forbidden because such “friendly”
discussion would, as Soloveitchik says, create pressures “to
trade favors pertaining to fundamental matters of faith, and
59

In that regard we should remember the cautionary note of Marvin Fox,
that “there are writers who claim to know the Rav’s unexpressed inner
thoughts, his unspoken aims and purposes, his conscious and
unconscious motivations, and who offer accounts of his thought based
on this supposed secret knowledge. There is in this style of
interpretation a level of presumptuousness which is not only tasteless,
but also profoundly and inexcusably misleading.” Marvin Fox, “The
Unity and Structure of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Thought,”
Tradition 24:2 (1989): 45-46.
60
Marc B. Shapiro, “’Confrontation’: A Mixed Legacy,” n.1, http://www.bc.
edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/
Sol_shapiro.htm. Hartman speaks of an “official political meeting of
‘representatives’ and ‘spokesmen’” as opposed to “students who are
studying together in university or theological colleges, or people wanting
to study Talmud or New Testament thought or Thomas Aquinas or
Maimonides together” [Hartman, Love and Terror, 157-58].
61
See note 34. Also Hershel Reichman, “The Cardinals’ Visit: Thoughts of
a Rosh Yeshiva,” The Commentator (Yeshiva Univ.), Feb. 17, 2004:
http://www.yucommentator.com/media/paper652/news/2004/02/17/Editorials
opEd/The-Cardinals.Visit.Thoughts.Of.A.Rosh.Yeshiva-607709.shtml
62

See note 26.
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to reconcile ‘some’ differences.”63 I suppose there is a
legitimate fear that propensity and intellectual intimacy (that
is to say “friendly” discussion) will lead to a “rounding of the
edges” that distinguish Judaism from the “other.”64 This is
the danger of syncretism that I discussed above.
Others have suggested that Soloveitchik used the term
“religious dialogue” to include not only “discussing with
priests the Gospels – their theology, but also... discussing
the Torah – which is our theology” including discussions of
Torah-u-Maadah65 (the combinations and intersections of
Jewish and secular studies).
Further, Jeremy Wieder analyzes “interfaith dialogue” as
referring to two faiths trying to engage in reconciliation. As
he suggests,
This, by definition, requires each side, as
the Rav formulates it, “to trade favors
pertaining to fundamental matters of faith.”
When the Rav speaks of “religious dialogue”
(as opposed to “social dialogue”) he refers not
to information sessions about faith matters,
but to dialogue, a conversation which
presumes genuine “give and take” between
the participants. If a Jew were to give a
lecture about some aspect of Jewish faith or
halakha to a non-Jew, even if the non-Jew
were to ask questions (thereby engaging in
“dialogue” in the common use of the term), he
63

Soloveitchik, “Confrontation,” p. 25.
Some, like David Berger, have criticized reciprocity: See David Berger,
“Statement Regarding the New York Times Ad by Dabru Emet,” (Sept.
14, 2000): http://www.ou.org/public/statements/2000/betty25.htm. See
also “Dabru Emet: A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity”
at: http://www.icjs.org/what/njsp/dabruemet.html.
65
One might consider the marked contrast in Heschel’s position in
Reuven Kimmelman, “Rabbis Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Abraham
Joshua Heschel on Jewish-Christian Relations,” Edah 4/2 (2004):1-21
at http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/4_2_Kimelman.pdf.
64
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would not be engaging in interfaith dialogue
but in interfaith monologue.66
Thus, describing an officially denominated “open
dialogue” between Chief Rabbis and Cardinals brought
together by the World Jewish Congress, the Jewish
participants explained their participation by stating that
“because there were no exchanges of views beyond the
prepared papers, it did not formally qualify as theological
dialogue.”67 Consider what is being suggested. Give and
take is dialogue and therefore forbidden; separate lectures
are not. And if the audience asks questions? If the lectures
are on point-counterpoint topics? These distinctions are so
formal as to be ultimately differences without a distinction.
To further muddy the waters, David Hartman suggests
that Soloveitchik’s fear is not the fact of interfaith dialogue
but the concern that the wrong type of person will undertake
it.68 Hartman reads Soloveitchik as intending “Confrontation”
as “a political responsum that addresses the issue of public
and politically charged discussions between Judaism and
Christianity as institutions. It is a response to the way Jews
are to survive in an open society that offers both intellectual
riches and the frightful reality of assimilation.”69 As many
have pointed out, Soloveitchik's work is replete with
references to Christian theologians. What Soloveitchik fears,
Hartman suggests, is the “westernized Jew” who “may well
66

Jeremy Wieder, “The Cardinals’ Visit: Differing Thoughts of Another
Rosh Yeshiva,” The Commentator (Yeshiva Univ.), Mar. 18, 2004:
http://www.yucommentator.com/media/paper652/news/2004/03/18/Editorials
opEd/The-Cardinals.Visit.Differing.Thoughts.Of.Another.Rosh.Yeshiva633447.shtml.

67

Nacha Cattan, “Cardinals Meet for a Dialogue with Top Rabbis” Forward
(Jan. 23, 2004).
68
I owe this interpretation of “Hartman on Soloveitchik” to Daniel Rynhold,
“The Philosophical Foundations of Soloveitchik's Critique of Interfaith
Dialogue,” Harvard Theological Review 96/1 (2003): 101-106.
69
Hartman, Love and Terror, 156-57.
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acquiesce in the subjugation of Judaism to universal
categories that will eliminate its numinous faith element.”70
This view is reinforced by Walter Wurzberger who
argues the prudential position that “only properly qualified
specialists should devote themselves to the study in depth of
non-Jewish theologies.”71 Wurzberger (and I believe,
Soloveitchik) considers that dialogue is a dialectical process
in the sense that “various particular formulations of religious
truth are but inadequate attempts to appropriate a higher but
rather elusive religious truth.”72 Soloveitchik rejects this view
as indeed he should. But analytically at least, Wurzberger
had it wrong. If it is true that the study of other theologies
(and in particular theologies that have arisen against the
context of Judaism) can teach us something about our own
faith, it need not be because we are “modif[ying] or
correct[ing] [religious faith] in the light of another system.”73
The desire to understand the other is not an effort to extract
“an essence of religion … from a variety of religious
affirmations.”74 This I believe is one of the root weaknesses
of Soloveitchik’s approach.
In fairness, I should note that Lawrence Kaplan urges a
more nuanced view of this distinction. He points out that
Soloveitchik “is careful never to speak of ‘the secular orders’
or ‘the secular sphere.’ He speaks of ‘the public world of
70

Rynhold: 106.
Walter S. Wurzburger, “Justification and Limitations of Interfaith
Dialogue,” in Walter S. Wurzburger & Eugene B. Borowitz, Judaism and
the Interfaith Movement (New York: Synagogue Council of America,
1967), 12. David Rosen tells us that the late Pinchas Peli cites to a
specific conversation he had with Soloveitchik affirming this view, David
Rosen, “Orthodox Judaism and Jewish-Christian Dialogue,” at
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/
soloveitchik/sol_rosen.htm.
72
Wurzburger, 13.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid., 14.
71
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humanitarian and cultural endeavors,’ of ‘areas of universal
concern,’ or ‘socio-cultural and moral problems.’”75
Kaplan suggests that for
the line between permissible and impermissible interfaith
dialogue is not between interfaith dialogue in “the realm
of faith” and interfaith dialogue in the “secular sphere.” It
is between two types of religious interfaith dialogue. The
Rav, that is, was opposed to interfaith religious
theological dialogue ‘concerning the doctrinal, dogmatic,
or ritual aspects of faith,’ for those aspects represent the
individual, unique, and private side of religion, but he
supported interfaith religious humanitarian dialogue
concerning socio-cultural and moral issues, for such
dialogue was grounded in religious categories and vales
that represent the universal and public side of religion.76
The distinction Kaplan suggests is more fully developed
in a document styled “On Interfaith Relationships” that
Soloveitchik drafted some years after “Confrontation” to
guide the practice of rabbis belonging to the Rabbinical
Council of America.77 There Soloveitchik states:
We are … opposed to any public debate, dialogue or
symposium concerning the doctrinal, dogmatic, or ritual
aspects of our faith vis-à-vis ‘similar’ aspects of another
faith community. … When however, we move from the
private world of faith to the public world of
humanitarianism and cultural endeavors, communication
among the various faith communities is desirable and
even essential. We are ready to enter into dialogue on
such topics as War and Peace, Poverty, Freedom, Man’s
Moral Values… Civil Rights, etc., which revolve about the

religious spiritual aspects of our civilization. Discussion
within these areas will, of course, be within the
framework of our religious outlooks and terminology.78
G. The Anti-Dialogue “Mood”
The wide variety of “understandings” of Soloveitchik’s
text suggests that whatever its original meaning, it has come
to mean something “more” on the Orthodox street. The ban
on dialogue has been extended way beyond intellectual
discussion to include, if not a ban on contact, then anything
that might be viewed as recognition. This is clear from the
remarkable controversy over the visit of a delegation of
cardinals to the Yeshiva University Beis Midrash (study hall)
in January 2004.79 The cardinals did not come to debate or
even to lecture, they came to watch. Even so, the backlash
among the Yeshiva world was extreme with many
commentators referring to a violation of Soloveitchik’s
ruling.80 And when the cardinals visited again in March 2005,
a student protest petition led the Yeshiva administration to
request that they come without their vestments81 and not
enter the study hall.82
78

Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “On Interfaith Relationships,” Rabbinical Rec.
(February 1966), also available at “Joseph B. Soloveitchik,
‘Confrontation’” in Norman Lamm and Walter S. Wurzburger eds., A
Treasury of “Tradition” (New York: Hebrew Pub. Co., 1967), 78-80.
Emphasis added.
79
A sparse account can be found in Daniel J. Wakin and Laurie
Goodstein, “In Upper Manhattan, Talmudic Scholars Look Up and Find
Cardinals Among the Rabbis,” New York Times, Jan. 20, 2004: B5.
80
Reichman; Ari Fridman, “Cardinals Visit Again Amid Student Pressure
Against,” The Commentator (Yeshiva Univ.), Mar. 8, 2005:
http://www.yucommentator.com/media/paper652/news/2005/03/08/News/Ca
rdinals. Visit.Again.Amid.Student.Pressure.Against-883249.shtml?page=1.
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Lawrence Kaplan, “Revisionism and the Rav: The Struggle for the Soul
of Modern Orthodoxy,” Judaism 48/3 (Summer 1999): 305.
76
Ibid., 306.
77
Ibid., 309.
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In a 1951 Supreme Court case analyzing the level of
deference courts should afford administrative agency
decisions, Justice Frankfurter famously tells us that
Congress did not articulate a specific level of deference, but
instead set a “mood.” 83 In reviewing the wide (and often
contradictory) range of understandings of “Confrontation,”
the only way we can reasonably interpret the “Soloveitchik
Doctrine” is that it reflects a “mood” (or hashkafa) rather than
an analytic parsing of the concept. Doing so may provide a
useful way of approaching the text. For one, it explains the
views of those commentators who have stressed
Soloveitchik’s context-oriented methodology. Further, it
focuses the discussion on what is happening in the orthodox
world today. Finally, it resolves the question of whether
Korn’s vision has moved considerably from the concerns and

making visit to Rome’s main synagogue, some congregants requested
(or demanded) that he should not come with his Papal vestments.
When the Chief Rabbi of Rome, Elio Toaff, raised this, the Pope
responded that if he were visiting as a private citizen then such a
stricture could be easily followed. However, the entire point of the
exercise was for him to visit as the head of the Roman Catholic Church
and, as such, he was required to wear his vestments. The point is worth
pondering.
82
Fridman. One student suggested that the presence of the Cardinals in
the Beis Midrash would be “emotionally distressing.” More resources
can be found in a former Yeshiva University student’s blog, at
http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2004/03/cardinals-in-beis-midrashrundown-of.html.
83
Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B.,340 U.S. 474,487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.):
It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And it
expressed its mood not merely by oratory but by legislation. As
legislation that mood must be respected, even though it can only
serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules
assuring sameness of application. Enforcement of such broad
standards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is
not for us to question that Congress may assume such qualities in the
federal judiciary.
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insights of the essay.84 While one can make an argument
either way, if one accepts my view that the essay articulates
a “mood” or skeptical approach to relations with Christianity,
the question is a non-issue.
2. Interreligious Dialogue & Christianity
A. Why are Orthodox Jews
Interaction with Christianity?

so

Cautious

About

It is difficult to understand the refusal to engage in
dialogue with Christianity, be it formal or informal, as
reflecting anything other than a deep insecurity of Judaism in
the theological arena.85 One senses that behind all this
animosity to talking with Christians is some kind of
psychological need – a desire to show that as a people we
don’t need them anymore. This view is reinforced by Erica
Brown’s suggestion that it is a denial of what she calls
“historical dignity” to talk with them.86 As Reichman pointed
out, “Millions of Jewish martyrs demand no less of us.”87
I can certainly understand this attitude which is validating
both to those who decry dialogue and to the Jewish people,
84

See Edward Breuer’s comment: “I do not think that Dr. Korn’s desire to
affirm the desirability and importance of interfaith dialogue can be fairly
rooted in Rav Soloveitchik’s essay” [“Revisiting ‘Confrontation’ After
Forty Years: Some Comments,” at http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/metaelements/texts/center/conferences/soloveitchik/sol_breuer.htm ].
85
I suppose it could also include a judgment by Jews that Christians do
not deserve to have Jews speak openly with them about Judaism. This
may be because of past Christian sins against Judaism and that it is not
appropriate or some would say “dignified” for Rabbis to talk with Church
officials (see following note). One commentator has suggested that a
meeting between clerics and Rabbis (let alone dialogue) is inferentially
forgiving the Church for past sins and goes so far as to ask “whether we
Jews today have the moral license to forgive the Church for sins
committed against the Jews in the past” [Reichman, see note 61].
86
Brown, “The Un-Response,” see note 44.
87
Reichman, see note 61.
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but it is hardly a normative rule. And indeed, from a
prudential perspective we should remember that even if it is
validating, it is validating only to ourselves. The fact that we
will not talk to Christians certainly does not make them feel
that they have been put in their place. To the extent that
Christians feel an obligation to Jews because of the
historical record, it is hard to believe that that sense of
Christian “guilt” is in any way increased because of the
Jewish refusal to engage in dialogue.
Some have further argued that even if the changes that
have occurred since World War II in Christian thought and
practice deserve full credit, the “conditions making for
present amity may not persist.”88 Indeed, some have
suggested that it will take a number of generations before
Jews can trust this Christian volte-face and respond
positively.89 While I agree with Shalom Carmy that “[t]he 20th
century … has been exceptionally hard on prophets of
inevitable progress in human relations[,]”90 that is at best an
argument to prudence in dialogue but not an absolute ban.
I suppose one could argue that it is possible to learn
what is valuable about the “other” without talking to them.
Presumably one can read books or listen to tapes. But surely
if you have overcome the general objection that one should
spend one’s spare time learning Torah rather than learning
about the other then limiting personal contact seems an
artificial constraint.
At a popular level the ignorance of Christianity in Israeli
circles is breathtaking, as is the lack of engagement at any
level, be it cultural, political, let alone theological. While it is
likely true that Israeli Jews do not have historical insecurity in
dealing with the Church, they often show an equally
unfortunate lack of respect for other religious traditions.
88
89
90

Carmy, see note 32.
Ibid. See also Klapper, (note 45).
Carmy.
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B. The Role of Christianity in Judaism
One thing is clear. While Christianity has recognized
Judaism as a source of Christian self-understanding, no
such correlative urge is felt in Jewish circles. More and
more, Christian seminaries offer courses in Judaism. I know
of no similar courses in Christianity or the early Church at
Jewish Theological Seminary or Yeshiva University. At a
recent gathering at the Catholic University of America, an
eminent Cardinal spoke with pride of his havruta (learning
partnership) in Talmud study and urged joint Talmud study
by Christian and Jewish scholars to better understand the
life of Jesus. Very few Jewish scholars seek similar joint
study of the Gospels to better elucidate the world of the early
rabbis.
This negativity towards Christianity exists across the
board not only in the yeshiva world, but in a more nuanced
manner, in modern orthodoxy as well. Deborah Weissman
suggests the situation is different in Israel.91 I am surprised
to learn it. At best, Israelis remain ignorant of any but the
most extreme caricatures of Christianity. Uri Bialer reports
that “the current curriculum of the state education system
refers to Jesus at best once and then only cursorily. The
state religious education system makes no mention
whatsoever.”92
Too often the treatment of Christians in Israel
approaches, at times, “the practice of contempt.” Recent
articles tell of religious Jews spitting on an Armenian
Archbishop and a crucifix during a religious procession and

91

Deborah Weissman, “The Perspective of an Israeli Educator,” at:
http://www.bc.edu/research/cjl/meta-elements/texts/center/conferences/
soloveitchik/sol_weissman.htm.
92
Uri Bialer, Cross on the Star of David, The Christian World in Israel’s
Foreign Policy, 1948-1967 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press,
2005), ix.
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numerous verbal and physical assaults on Christian clergy.93
In 1995 a religious soldier sprayed gunfire at a church in
Haifa, claiming, according to the Jerusalem Post, that “it was
a shame that he had to explain in court his motive for the
shooting, which he said was self explanatory and written in
Torah. His motive, he said, was to destroy all idols….”94
While this attitude reflects a significant issue in Jewish
sociology (and thought) regarding the status of the non-Jew,
the insularity it reflects is heightened by the refusal to
dialogue. While, as seen below, there may be some flexibility
at the level of institutional leadership, other than David
Rosen there are precious few orthodox rabbis in Israel or
America who engage in interfaith anything, let alone
dialogue with Christianity and I won’t even speak of Islam.95
C. The Chief Rabbis’ Initiatives
In recent years the Vatican has entered into official
dialogue with a group of Israeli rabbis organized by the Chief
Rabbinate of Israel (both Ashkenazi and Sephardic). This
93

Steven Erlanger, “Spitting Incident Fuels Debate on Intolerance –
Jerusalem Examines its Religious Divide,” International Herald Tribune,
Oct. 19, 2004: http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/10/18/news/journal.php;
also his, “Many Faiths but Little Tolerance in Jerusalem,” International
Herald
Tribune, Oct.
20,
2004:
http://www.iht.com/articles/
2004/10/19/news/journal.php; Abigail Radoszkowicz, “Interfaith Leaders
Issue Plea for Mutual Respect,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 27, 2004, in
News; Amiram Barkat, “Christians in Jerusalem Want Jews to Stop
Spitting on Them,” Haaretz, Dec. 10, 2004: http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=487412;. These articles describe this
and similar incidents. See also, the editorial, “Jerusalem’s Disgrace,”
Haaretz, Dec. 10, 2004: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/
ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=487472&contrassID=1.
94
I owe this reference to David Berger. The article is “Soldier Who Shot
up Church Sent for Psychiatric Evaluation: Suspect Says He Was
Destroying Idols,” Jerusalem Post, May 28, 1995: 12.
95
The remarkable Mordecai Froman, the Rav of Tekoa in Judea, is a
notable exception.
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dialogue has been undertaken by the “Joint Commission of
the Chief Rabbinate of Israel’s Delegation for Relations with
the Catholic Church and the Holy See’s Commission for
Religious Relations with the Jews.” There have been five
meetings, two in Jerusalem and three in Rome which have
included visits to the Vatican and audiences with the Pope.96
A wide variety of issues were on the table for discussion.
These have included subjects including The Sanctity of
Human Life and Family Values; The Relevance of Central
Religious Teachings in the Holy Scriptures We Share, for
Contemporary and Future Society; A Shared Vision of Social
Justice and Ethical Conduct; and Respect for Human Life.
The sacred character of the Holy Places in Jerusalem was
also discussed.97
96

A preliminary meeting took place on June 5, 2002, for which no official
statement was made. The texts of four joint statements that have been
issued from subsequent meetings can be found at the Vatican’s website
at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/subindex/index_relations-jews.htm.
In addition to the above, Pope Benedict XVI published on October 26,
2005 a letter commemorating Nostra Aetate: http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2005/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_
20051026_nostra-aetate_en.html. See too David Rosen, “Nostra
Aetate, Forty Years After Vatican II: Present and Future Perspectives:”
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relations
-jews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20051027_rabbi-rosen_en.html.
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See “Statement to the Press from the Meeting of the Bilateral
Committee of the Holy See’s Commission for Religious Relations with
the Jews and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, Oct. 17-19 2004”:
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/relationsjews-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20041019_rabbinate-israel_en.html :
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Jerusalem has a sacred character for all the children of Abraham. We
call on all relevant authorities to respect this character and to prevent
actions which offend the sensibilities of religious communities that reside
in Jerusalem and hold her dear. We call on religious authorities to protest
publicly when actions of disrespect towards religious persons, symbols
and Holy Sites are committed, such as the desecration of cemeteries and
the recent assault on the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem. We call on
them to educate their communities to behave with respect and dignity
towards people and towards their attachment to their faith.
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While it has been suggested that the agenda items have
been carefully worded to escape the strictures of
Soloveitchik’s position, any suggestion that the agenda items
are not impregnated with theological considerations is, at
best, caviling. The documents are drenched with a religious
anthropology and if anything make short shrift of the view
that the faith community can talk about family values or
social justice without God.
The Israeli Chief Rabbinate, of course, unlike American
modern orthodoxy, has never viewed itself as “under” Rabbi
Soloveitchik’s legal authority. Furthermore, to my knowledge,
the Chief Rabbinate has never provided a halakhic analysis
of the rationale for these meetings. Perhaps they viewed
them as self-evident! Nonetheless, this deepening
engagement and its obviously theological character
significantly undercuts the practical force of the so-called
Soloveitchik prohibition.
The reasons for the willingness or the apparent
willingness of the Israeli rabbinate to “engage” the Vatican
may be in part political – in some sense they represent the
State of Israel. It may, of course, reflect a different halakhic
reading of the sources, a point well worth further analysis.
However, their position reflects to some extent a Jewish selfconfidence that comes from Jewish sovereignty. The Israeli
rabbinate, whatever their halakhic views regarding
interaction with non-Jews, finds it hard to accept
Soloveitchik’s overriding fear that the “community of the
many” will necessarily manipulate and control the
“community of the few.” Dr. Deborah Weissman suggests
that the insecurity this refusal reflects does not really exist in
Israeli Orthodox circles.98 Figures like Chief Rabbi She’ar
Yashuv Cohen of Haifa, head of the Chief Rabbinate’s
Committee on Relations with the Vatican, have felt it easier
to engage in interreligious dialogue than their American
Orthodox colleagues. Following a meeting with the Latin,
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Greek, and Armenian patriarchs, She’ar Yashuv Cohen
noted, “Both sides understand that there is to be no attempt
to change the other’s opinions. Ever since the Pope’s recent
ruling against missionizing Jews, this has become much
easier.”99 This is understandable. Zionist ideology tells us
that the creation of a Jewish state will eliminate the unequal
relationships with other nations and religions. And Israeli
Jews do not experience any such inequality in their daily life.
Thus for Israelis the grounds for Soloveitchik’s fear of
religious dialogue no longer exist. And indeed because of
this majority status, even though there is significant
negativity to Christianity in Israeli culture, the political and
rabbinic leadership may well feel freer to interact with
Christian clerics, if only, for “reasons of state.”
3. Where Do We Go From Here?
It should be obvious that the Orthodox Jewish
community’s response to “Confrontation” has been more
sociological than theological or philosophical. The essay has
been interpreted by the Orthodox rabbinate to apply to a far
greater range of activities than Soloveitchik actually
discussed in his essay and is used to validate a general
attitudinal approach by Orthodox Judaism – one that is
broadly antagonistic to a wide range of interactions with the
Catholic Church. The ways in which “Confrontation” has
played out in the Orthodox world reflects the sociological and
psychological needs of a community both traumatized by the
Holocaust and increasingly self-assertive (if not triumphalist)
with the rise of the State of Israel and the uniquely
successful integration of Jews into American political life.
Some kinds of activities have been approved – largely
social and political issues in which the Jewish community
had a deep concern. But when the Jewish community was
99
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See note 91.

Breger, “A Reassesssment of Rav Soloveitchik’s Essay on Interfaith Dialogue” 167

“Rabbi & MKs Upgrade Israel-Christian Relations,” Arutz Sheva, Jan.
24, 2005: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=75808.
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interested in such joint action, it made no difference that the
basis for the social and political coalition was in its
underlying nature theological.
This attitude is reflected in the almost extreme skepticism
regarding Catholic-Jewish relations of many of the Orthodox
commentators to Korn’s essay.100 The comments are
permeated with a sense that the Church can turn on a dime
and revert to its outdated supersessionist theology. There is
also a frankly surreal approach to the place of Jews in the
modern world. It is as if we are the center of the universe
and make judgments as independent actors without
reference to the view of others. While that happy state may
come to pass at the end of days, until then we remain “in”
history, not outside it, and must accommodate to it or suffer
the consequences.
It is unfortunate that those who would forbid full
engagement with other faith-based communities neglect the
costs of such parochialism. To the extent to which dialogue
helps us to better understand the belief system of the
“other,” we come to better understand ourselves. Indeed, it
is, I think, a truism that every social and intellectual
movement develops, at least in part, because of some
human or social need. Many scholars have suggested “that
the Nazis did draw their popular support from people who felt
morally outraged by the social order around them.”101
100

Carmy (note 32); Klapper (note 45); Brown (note 86).
Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and
Revolt (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 417. The social
composition of National Socialist membership was drawn
disproportionately from “the rural farmers and small-town middle
classes” [Stanley G. Payne, Fascism (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin
Press, 1980), 58]. A more nuanced view of “the attraction of the
successful fascist movements for millions of peasants and workers” can
be found in Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 45. See also Alan S. Milward, “Fascism
and the Economy,” in Walter Laqueur ed., Fascism – A Reader’s Guide
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976), 385: “[T]he propensity to join
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Methodism responded to a need of the English peasants to
find a place in a rapidly industrializing society.102 And
Sabbatarianism in the 17th century can be understood as a
response to the political instability and social revolt reflected
in what many historians have termed the general “crisis of
the seventeenth century.”103 So by understanding the belief
system of the other we understand better the variety of ways
in which human beings respond to the social and
psychological forces that beset them. In so doing, we tease
out yet another thread of the tapestry of mankind, and we
learn more about the manifold creatures of God.
The value of interfaith dialogue is not simply that it
assists our understanding of the human tapestry. It has
practical benefits to the Jewish people as well. If we accept
that Christians are attempting to revise their historically
pejorative theological understanding of Judaism, why should
a fascist part was determined more by psychological considerations
than by social class”.
102
Elie Halévy, The Birth of Methodism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1971), 64-65. See also Julia Stewart Werner, The Primitive Methodist
Connexion: Its Background and Early History 30-50 (Madison, Wis.:
Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984). For a sociological analysis of the
emergence of Methodism, see E.P. Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 350-400.
103
The term comes from E.J. Hobsbawm, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth
Century,” in Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (New York:
Basic Books, 1965), 5-58. See Stephen Sharot, Messianism, Mysticism,
and Magic: A Sociological Analysis of Jewish Religious Movements
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1982), 110. We should note
that the great historian of the Sabbatean movement, Gershom Scholem,
rejects this analysis of Sabbatarianism as “simplistic[,]” see Gershom
Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah 1626-1676 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1973), 1. But more recent scholarship
considers Scholem’ s view that the Lurianic Kabbalah was “the central
factor in the use of Sabbatarianism” as a flawed analysis suggesting
“that the Sabbatean movement was a result of the forces of change that
already existed in the Jewish community, rather than its cause.” See
Matt Goldish, The Sabbatean Prophets (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2004), 168-69.
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we not assist them by providing accurate understandings of
Jewish theological doctrine? Whatever else it may prove to
be, proactive interfaith dialogue today is not the zero-sum
game of a disputation or a covert effort at conversion but a
chance for Jews to eliminate stereotypes and dispel misperceptions by presenting an accurate view of Jewish belief.
Furthermore, the reality is that we face the possibility of a
war of civilizations between the West and Islam (indeed,
some believe that war is at hand). Unless we are of the
despairing view that religion can only be a source of human
fratricide (think Thirty Years’ War), we should be searching
for every possible modality by which religion can serve a
transformative role – and serve as a source for peace
between nations and, indeed, civilizations. While one might
respond that coalitions oriented toward the delivery of social
services satisfy that need and are sufficient unto the day,
relationships based on calculated self-interest are far
different than relationships based on authentic engagement.
We are engaged, as well, in a cultural war in our own
country. While it may be an exaggeration to say that “the
barbarians are at the gates,” there can be little doubt that
many persons of faith have more in common with each other
in America than with secular society. Abraham Heschel
understood this well:
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another in preserving one’s respective legacy, in
preserving a common legacy?104
Most adherents of the “Soloveitchik doctrine” allow
interfaith coalitions under narrow restrictions: they must deal
only with politics or the delivery of social services. In my
view this kind of narrow interaction, however, fails to capture
the human and spiritual synergies that could come from the
full and vibrant interaction of all those who claim themselves
as “children of Abraham.”

[T]here is another ecumenical movement, worldwide in
extent and influence:
nihilism.
We must choose
between interfaith and inter-nihilism. Cynicism is not
parochial. Should religions insist upon the illusion of
complete isolation? Should we refuse to be on speaking
terms with one another and hope for each other’s failure?
Or should we pray for each other’s health, and help one
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